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CHAPTER 13 
Crimes 
STUDENT CoMMENTS 
§13.1. The effect of prejudicial publicity upon the jury's impar-
tiality and the right to a fair trial: Commonwealth v. Stanley.! While 
on patrol duty during a November night in 1968, State. Police Officer 
Richard Stockwell stopped a motorist for speeding on Route 91 near the 
Vermont border.2 Stockwell approached the operator, who had stepped 
out of his car. and requested that he produce his driver's license. When 
the driver leaned back into his car, the trooper looked towards the rear of 
the vehicle. Suddenly he was kicked in the groin causing him to fall to the 
ground where he was kicked several more times before losing conscious-
ness. His attacker escaped· in the automobile. 
Officer Stockwell later identified Thomas Stanley as his assailant and 
Stanley was charged with assault and battery upon a police officer.8 On 
January 30, 1969, the District Court of Greenfield found the defendant 
guilty of the charges and sentenced him to fifteen months in jail. An 
appeal was filed for a trial de novo in the superior court.4 
§13.1. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 249, 292 N.E.2d 694. As there was no question of 
pre-trial publicity raised in Commonwealth v. Stanley, this comment shall concentrate on 
the issue of prejudicial material, specifically, published media reports, appearing dur-
ing the course of the criminal trial. However, much of the following discussion would, 
of course, apply to the problems raised by pre-trial publicity. 
2 The statement of facts presented in this comment is compiled from the opinion of 
the Supreme Judicial Court, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 249-50, 292 N.E.2d at 694-95; Brief 
for the Commonwealth at 1-4; Defendant's Bill of Exceptions at 1-9; Brief for the 
Defendant at 1-6; and the Greenfield Recorder, May 25, 1971, at 1.0, col. I. 
3 Whoever commits an assault and battery upon a police officer or fire fighter eu-
gaged in the performance of his duty shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than ten days nor more than two and one half years in a house of correction 
or by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred 
dollars. 
G.L. c. 265, §!liD. 
4 The appeal to the superior court was pursuant to G.L. c. 212, §6; c. 278, §18. 
The defendant on his appeal to the Superior Court, as a result of a finding of the 
District Court that he is guilty, is eutitled to a trial de novo in the Superior Court. 
The trial is held under the same rules and procedure as are other criminal cases 
in the Superior Court. 
20 K. Smith, Massachusetts Practice §756, at 360 (1962). See Mann v. Commonwealth, 
1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1027, 271 N.E.2d lllll; Commonwealth v. Leach, 246 Mass. 464, 
141 N.E. !101 (192!1). 
1
Prince and Rakove: Chapter 13: Crimes
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1973
§llU CRIMES 475 
On May 24, 1971 the case was called to trial before a jury in the 
superior court in Greenfield. During the trial's second day, the defen-
dant's attorney called the court's attention to a newspaper article which 
had appeared that morning in the Greenfield Recorder. The article 
stated that Stanley was "appealing a District Court conviction of assault 
and battery on State Trooper Richard Stockwell, who was brutally 
beaten while on duty .... "II It further revealed that the case had already 
been defaulted twice when Stanley's attorney had failed to appear and 
that an additional year had been added to the defendant's sentence. 
Finally, the story stated that Justice Ammi Cutter of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court had ordered that the case be tried in Franklin County Superior 
Court, but that it had been postponed in early May because Stanley's 
attorney had been unable to come to Greenfield due to another trial 
commitment.8 The defendant immediately moved for a mistrial citing 
the article's prejudicial effect upon the jurors as well as its presence in the 
jury room. 
Prior to ruling on the motion, the judge asked each juror if he had 
read about the case in the newspapers, and, if so, whether any opinions 
or prejudice had been formed. Four jurors admitted having read the 
article,7 but they all denied holding any bias or opinion which would 
prevent them from reaching a fair and impartial verdict. The court then 
warned the jurors to disregard the article and not to read any further 
publicity pertaining to the case. The motion for a mistrial was denied. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the following day. 
The defendant's appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court . claimed, in 
essence, that he had not received a fair trial before an impartial jury. 
Specifically, he assigned the trial judge's denial of the motion for a mis-
trial as prejudicial error.s It was asserted that the reading of the Recorder 
story by some of the jurors and the presence of the newspaper article in 
the jury room were each grounds upon which a mistrial should have been 
granted. 
II Greenfield Recorder, May 25, 1971, at 10, col. 1. 
aId. 
7 One juror said that from scanning through the article he knew it concerned the 
case, but he was unable to say exactly what it said. A second admitted reading one 
and a half paragraphs, while a third read the list of jurors. The fourth juror admitted 
he read the entire story and had brought the paper into the jury room. Additionally, 
a fifth juror stated that the sheriff had confiscated the article before he had a chance 
to read it. Defendant's Bill of Exceptions at 8-9. 
8 The defendant also questioned the propriety of the trial court's admission into 
evidence of Stockwell's in-court identification. Brief for the Defendant at 6-IL The 
Supreme Judicial Court found this exception to be without merit because the de-
fendant had failed to raise an objection during the trial to the in-court identification, 
and therefore had waived his claim. In addition, the court accepted the trial court's 
finding that the in-court identification had an independent basis and origin. 1973 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 250-51, 292 N.E.2d at 695. 
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The majority of the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with Stanley's 
contentions. 9 The physical presence of the newspaper in the jury room was 
summarily dismissed as not adding "significantly to the likelihood of 
prejudice."10 The court proceeded to state that 
a finding that the defendant had not been prejudiced was warranted 
••• [as long as the trial court's instructions to the jury were] 
prompt, clear, and forceful ... [as well as] sufficiently strong to 
counteract the possible effect of the adverse publicity.11 
It was then pointed out that as the defendant's bill of exceptions had not 
included all of the charge given by the judge, no issue was raised as to the 
adequacy of the instructions.12 Concluding that the defendant's right to a 
fair trial was not prejudiced, the court overruled the defendant's excep-
tions.18 
Justice Reardon, in dissent, declared that the defendant's right to an 
impartial trial14 had been "gravely imperilled by extrinsic material which 
found its way into the jury room."111 Referring to the fact that one-third 
of the jury had read the Recorder article, Reardon stated that it was his 
opinion that Stanley had not received a fair trial and that a mistrial 
should have been declared.1e 
This comment will examine the separate opinions in Commonwealth v. 
Stanley in light of the case law concerning a criminal defendant's right 
to trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and 
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Ini-
tially, the problems complicating the judicial observance of this right will 
be considered. The development of the formula applied by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in cases involving possible prejudicial publicity will then 
be traced showing that the majority decision in Stanley is entirely consis-
tent with Massachusetts precedents and earlier federal law. Justice Rear-
don's dissenting opinion will then be discussed in view of the recent 
rulings of the United States Supreme Court on the issue of jury impar-
tiality. Finally, after a critical analysis of the Supreme Judicial Court's 
adoption of the traditional formula, it will be submitted that the court 
9 The majority opinion in the 4-1 decision was written by Justice Braucher. 197! 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 249,292 N.E.2d at 694. 
10 Id. at 252, 292 N.E.2d at 696. 
11 Id., citing Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1!67, 275 
N.E.2d SS (eniphaais in original). 
12 197! Mass. Adv. Sh. at 252, 292 N.E.2d at 696. 
1a Id. at 25!, 292 N.E.2d at 697. 
14 "The Trial of all Crimes ••• ahall be by Jury." U.S. Const. art. III, §2. "In all 
aiminal prosecutions, the aa:used ahall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury •••• " U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
111 197! Mau. Adv. Sh. at 25!, 292 N.E.2d at 697 (dissenting opinion). 
18 Id. at 258-59, 292 N.E.2d at 700 (dissenting opinion). 
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should reconsider its policy in reviewing convictions alleged to be defec-
tive due to prejudicial publicity. 
The issue raised in Commonwealth v. Stanley, to wit, whether poten-
tially prejudicial publicity appearing during the trial sufficiently dimin-
ished the impartiality of the jury to render the defendant's trial unfair, 
has long been a major concern of those involved with the administration 
of the criminal justice system in the United States. The Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution declares that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an im-
partial jury ... ,"17 On its face, this directive would appear to be 
unmistakably intelligible: the defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
entitled to a trial by jurors who are not biased or prepossessed. But two 
factors have often combined to complicate the observance of this man-
date as applied to cases involving the newspaper reporting of trials: first, 
the absence of constitutional standards of impartiality, and second, the 
First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. 
Although the Sixth Amendment requires an impartial jury, the Consti-
tution does not establish standards of impartiality by which a court may 
determine if a defendant has been denied this constitutional right.1B It 
does not contain guidelines to aid the courts in defining impartiality and 
in evaluating the fitness of jurors to sit in criminal trials. Further, the 
classic common law statement of impartiality, uttered by Lord Coke, that 
a juror should be "indifferent as he stands unswom,"19 adds but a small 
insight to the problem.20 Hence, the American judiciary has had to pro-
vide itself with a workable standard of impartiality to apply in criminal 
cases,21 
17 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
18 See Comment, The Case Against Trial by Newspapers: Analysis and Proposal, 
57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 217 (1962). 
19 III Co. Litt. §155b, at 460 (Coke, First Institute) (Thomas ed. 1818). 
20 Lord Coke's concept seemed to be that it was not significant that a juror swore 
an _oath of impartiality, but that he was impartial prior to taking that oath. 
21 One of the first to face the problem was Chief Justice John Marshall. Writing 
in the much publicized treason trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall set down 
some basic precepts: 
[A)n impartial jury ... must be composed of men who will fairly hear the testi-
mony which may be offered to them, and bring in their verdict according to that 
testimony, and according to the law arising on it. This is not to be expected ••• 
where the jurors, before they hear the testimony, have deliberately formed and 
delivered an opinion that the person whom they are to try is guilty or innocent 
of the charge alleged against him. The jury should enter upon the trial with 
minds open to those impressions which the testimony and the law of the case 
ought to make, not with those preconceived opinions which will resist those im-
pressions. 
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (No. 14,692g) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). Justice Clark 
presented a more somber view in 196!1 when he wrote that "it is an impossible stan-
dard to require that tribunal to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed of 
4
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Perhaps it was Chief Justice Hughes who best expressed the dilemma 
of the elusive concept: 
Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For 
the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, 
the Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not 
chained to any ancient and artificial formula.22 
Hughes' resigned comments summarize the problem well. As there are no 
constitutional standards specifically defining the Sixth Amendment's 
requirement of an impartial jury, the courts must face questions of jury 
prejudice on a case by case basis. 
It is against this backdrop of the absence of constitutional standards 
of impartiality that the second factor, the First Amendment's guarantee 
of freedom of the press,28 plays such a dominant role in complicating 
the courts' observance of the right of an accused to a trial by an impar-
tial jury. The press, of course, covers the news as well as editorializes, 
and the perpetration of crime is always news in which the society is 
interested and of which it has the right to be informed. But among the 
audience served by the press are jurors who may be exposed thereby to 
extrajudicial commentary concerning the case. One obvious result of this 
exposure is that jurors may formulate opinions regarding the case which 
will influence their perceptions of the evidence presented at the trial as 
well as their verdict. This is particularly true when the crime involved is 
deemed sensational or heinous, prompting extensive press 'coverage.2' 
Yet it should be recognized that the problem also exists in less dramatic 
criminal cases that gather limited publicity, for if jurors should happen 
to see a media account, the possibility of prejudice is still present. Even a 
completely responsible and objective report may relate information not 
presented at the trial and therefore prevent a juror from reaching his 
, conclusions solely upon the evidence of the case. The true seriousness of 
the consequences that the workings of a free press may have upon the 
requirement of juror impartiality was shown in a recent major study 
undertaken by the American Bar Association Advisory Committee on 
Fair Trial and Free Press.211 The study pointed out that a juror's delibera-
any external factors." Rideau v. Louisiana, !175 U.S. 72!1, 7llll (196!1) (dissenting opin-
ion). 
22 United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 12!1, 145-46 (19!16). 
23 "Congress shall make no law • • • abridging the freedom • • • of the press • • • .'' 
U.S. Const. amend. L 
u The trials of Dr. Sam Sheppard in Ohio, Sheppard v. Maxwell, !184 U.S. llllll 
(1966), and of Bruno Hauptmann in New Jersey, State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 
412, 180 A. 809, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (19!15) (Lindbergh kidnapping), are two ex-
amples of sellBational crimes which drew extensive media publicity. For a further list-
ing and discussion, see J. Lofton, Justice and the Press 72-110 (1966); see also D. 
Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial 44-61 (1966). 
211 The Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press was created by the Amer-
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tions may be affected by extrajudicial commentary even though he 
himself is unaware of any influence.26 The Committee concluded "that 
there is indeed a substantial danger of an unfair trial when potentially 
prejudicial information reaches the eyes or ears of the trier of fact.'' 27 One 
of the Committee's recommendations was the following: 
[A] verdict of guilty in any criminal case [should] be set aside and a 
new trial granted whenever, on the basis of competent evidence, the 
court finds a substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more 
jurors was influenced by exposure to an extrajudicial communication 
of any matter relating to the defendant or to the case itself that was 
not part of the trial record on which the case was submitted to the 
jury.2s 
Hence, a conflict inherent in the Bill of Rights creates the problem 
which complicates compliance with the mandate of the Sixth Amend-
ment. Whereas the First Amendment guarantees society's right to. be 
informed by a free and uncensored press, the Sixth Amendment requires 
the same informed society to produce a jury from its members which is 
not biased in its attitude towards the criminal defendant. It has been 
said that a significant test of the quality of a civilized society is its treat-
ment of those accused by its criminal justice system.29 If we accept this 
proposition, the problem raised by the effect of prejudicial publicity 
upon the fairness of the trial of the accused is one of the utmost gravity. 
It should be of little surprise, therefore, that cases revolving around 
this important constitutional question have been much litigated at the 
appellate level. The Advisory Committee Report commented "that in a 
period of a little over two years, from January 1963 to March 1965, there 
were approximately 100 reported decisions in which this question was 
raised.''80 Justice Frankfurter wrote concerning the Supreme Court's 
ican Bar Association Special Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice to research and report specifically on the problems raised by 
the fair trial/free press conflict. The Committee's chairman was Paul C •. Reardon, 
Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, who wrote the dissent-
ing opinion in Commonwealth v. Stanley. The Standards Relating to Fair Trial and 
Free Press recommended by the Committee were approved by the American Bar As-
sociation's House of Delegates on Feb. 19, 1968. ABA Advisory Committee on Fair 
Trial and Free Press, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press (1968) [herein-
after cited as Approved Draft of Standards]. 
26 ABA Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, Standards Relating to 
],'air Trial and Free Press 61 (Tent. Draft, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Tentative Draft 
of Standards]. · 
27 Id. at 66. 
28 Approved Draft of Standards, supra note 25, §3.6, at 13. 
29 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
so Tentative Draft of Standards, supra note 26, at 23 (emphasis in original). "More-
over, the reported decisioi}S ••• represent only the top of the iceberg so far as the 
magnitude of the problem is concerned." Id. 
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activity that "[n]ot a term passes without this Court being importuned 
to review convictions, had in States throughout the country, in which sub-
stantial claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted because of 
inflammatory newspaper accounts ... ,"81 
In handling these cases, the courts have attempted to resolve the prob-
lem of the meaning of impartiality by seeking to determine if the verdict 
was tainted by extrajudicial influences. The philosophy guiding the 
courts in this approach was explained by Justice Holmes in Patterson v. 
Colorado82 as follows: 
The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a 
case will be induced only by the evidence and arguments in open 
court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or 
public print.88 
Federal appellate courts have in the past readily adopted the view that 
the trial judge, by virtue of his presence at the time of the alleged preju-
dicial influence, is the best qualified judicial authority to rule on the 
possible effects of the outside influence upon the fairness of the trial. The 
rule was established in Reynolds v .. United States that "[t]he finding of 
the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set aside by a reviewing 
court, unless the error is manifest."B4 In applying this rule in criminal 
convictions which had been appealed on the grounds of prejudicial pub-
licity, the federal courts sought to determine if the error was "manifest" 
by ascertaining if the defendant's case had actually been prejudiced by 
the material.81l This obviously necessitated finding whether any jurors 
had been exposed to the allegedly prejudicial influence.86 But often there 
were cases in which the trial court, realizing that extrajudicial matter 
may have adversely affected the defendant's case, sought to prevent a 
mistrial by taking remedial measures designed specifically to offset the 
harm. The appellate court, having taken note of the curative warnings 
given to the jurors, might conclude that the harmful effect of the pub-
licity must have been removed, and that there was therefore no conclu-
81 Irvin v. Dowd, !166 U.S. 717, 7!10 (1961) (concurring opinion). 
82 205 u.s. 454 (1907). 
88 Id. at 462. 
84 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878); accord, Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910). 
In applying this rule, the Supreme Court has traditionally required that the "showing 
[of] essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to 
have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but 
as a demonstrable reality." Adams v. McCann, !117 U.S. 269, 281 (1942); Buchalter v. 
New York, !119 U.S. 427, 4!11 (194!1). But see notes 106 and 118 infra. 
811 See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145 (1878); United States v. Cimini, 427 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 
(1970); Massicot v. United States, 254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1958). 
86 See McHenry v. United States, 276 F. 761 (D.C. Cir. 1921). 
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sive showing of prejudice to the defendant's case.u Thus, a heavy burden 
was placed on the appellant to show that the trial judge had failed to 
exercise sound judicial discretion,ss and that the error was manifest.89 
As will be discussed later, although the Supreme Court commenced in 
1959 to move away from this policy of placing great reliance upon the 
trial judge's handling of the problem, most of the state courts in cases 
involving questions of prejudicial publicity; and jury impartiality 
adopted this early pattern set by the federal judiciary.40 
The approach taken consistently by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts has been in conformity with this traditional treatment. 
As early as 1926, the court, although it was dealing with a civil case, 
stated that the trial court had the prime responsibility for granting a 
mistrial due to the effect of extrajudicial publicity upon the jury.41 In 
words similar to those employed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Reynolds v. United States,42 the Supreme Judicial Court declared that 
"[u]nless clearly wrong, [the trial judge's] determination will not be 
disturbed."48 
In 1942, in Commonwealth v. Barker,44 the court outlined its approach 
to cases in which the validity of criminal convictions was being chal-
lenged due to potentially prejudicial publicity. In that case, the trial 
judge denied a motion for a mistrial after a newspaper story, published 
during the trial, had revealed that the defendant was to "be tried later ... 
in connection with other indictments."411 Following the Holmes phi-
37 See Massicot v. United States, 254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Pisano, 
19!J F.2d !J55 (7th Cir. 1951); United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945), 
cert. denied, !J27 U.S. 787 (1946). 
as Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); United. States v. Carruthers, 152 
F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945). 
89 This burden was met in many cases resulting in r~ersals of the verdicts. See, 
e.g., Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149 (1894); United States v. Dressler, 112 F.2d 972 (7th 
Cir. 1940); Griffin v. United States, 295 F. 4!J7 (!Jd Cir. 1924). 
40 See, e.g., State v. Snowden, 198 La. 1076, 5 So. 2d 355 (1941); Commonwealth v. 
Valverdi, 218 Pa. 7, 66 A. 877 (1907). One notable exeeption was the treatment once 
given this question by the Iowa Supreme Court, which declared that any reading of 
newspaper reports by jurors required a mistrial. State v. Caine, l!J4 Iowa 147, Ill N.W. 
44!J (1907); State v. Peirce, 178 Iowa 417, 159 N.W. 1050 (1916). This strict rule was later 
overruled by that court and replaced with the requirement that there be a showing 
that the impartiality of the jury was diminished. State v. McLaughlin, 250 Iowa 455, 
94 N .W .2d !JO!J (1959). 
41 Taylor v. Creeley, 257 Mass. 21, 152 N.E. !J (1926). The issue at trial in Taylor 
was whether Creeley was of sound mind at the time he executed his last will, but 
newspaper coverage of the case raised the inflammatory possibility that Taylor, the 
executor of the will, had asserted undue influence upon the testator. 
42 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See text at note M supra. 
48 257 Mass. at 26, 152 N.E. at 4. 
44 !Jll Mass. 82,40 N.E.2d 265 (1942). 
411 Id. at 87,40 N.E.2d at 268. 
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losophy,4e the Supreme Judicial Court agreed that "[t]he parties were 
entitled to have the case decided only upon the evidence that was intro-
duced at the tria1."47 But then the court set out its version of the federal 
rule: 
It was the duty of the judge to determine whether the rights of the 
defendant were adversely affected by the publication. Much must be 
left to the discretion of the trial judge, and his denial of the motion 
implies a finding that the defendant had not been prejudiced. The 
action of the judge cannot be said to constitute an abuse of sound 
judicial discretion.4s 
In Commonwealth v. Eagan,411 the court was faced with a direct chal-
lenge to its "sound judicial discretion" thesis. In that case, patently 
prejudicial newspaper stories appeared during the second day of the 
trial and were read by every member of the jury as well as by the two 
alternates.ll0 The trial court polled the jurors as to the impact of the 
articles upon them and one juror was replaced by an alternate when she 
expressed doubts as to her ability to ignore the publicity. The judge then 
instructed the jury to disregard all extrajudicial commentary in reaching 
their verdict and denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial.ll1 The 
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction and concluded that, in 
view of the judge's prompt actions to offset the effects of the prejudicial 
matter, he did not abuse his judicial discretion in deciding that the 
publication of the articles had not prevented the defendant from receiv-
ing a fair trial.112 The court placed special emphasis on the judge's prompt 
inquiry and strong instruc:;tions to the jury.118 The court also reiterated 
its adherence to the rule that jurors are presumed to have complied with 
the judge's instructions to discount all evidence not properly before 
them.114 
It was in 1971, in Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co.,1111 that the 
Supreme Judicial Court, adhering to the approach employed in the Barker 
and Eagan cases, phrased its test, later to be used in Stanley,lle for deter-
" See text at note 88 supra. 
47 811 Mass. at 88,40 N.E.2d at 269. 
48 Id. 
411 M7 Mass. 585,259 N.E.2d 548 (1970). 
GO The articles appeared in the Boston Globe and the Boston Herald-Traveler and 
related that the defendants had been arrested on their way to court for carrying a 
"sawed-off" shotgun. Id. at 588, 259 N.E.2d at 550. 
Ill Id., 259 N.E.2d at 550-51. 
112 Id. at 588-89, 259 N.E.2d at 551. 
118 Id. at 589,259 N.E.2d at 551. 
M Id., citing Commonwealth v. BelUno, lJ20 Mass. 685, 71 N.E.2d 411, cert. denied, 
8!10 u.s. 882 (1947). 
1111 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1867, 275 N.E.2d 88, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972). 
118 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 252, 292 N.E.2d at 696. 
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mining whether a mistrial is required when prejudicial publicity has 
reached the jury in a criminal trial. The court held that the "judge's 
prompt, clear, and forceful instructions to the jury . . . were hardly 
susceptible of misunderstanding by the jury .... The instructions given 
were, in the circumstances sufficiently strong to counteract the possible 
effect of the adverse publicity,"GT and therefore the trial judge was within 
his sound judicial discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. 
The only case in recent Massachusetts history in which the Supreme 
Judicial Court felt compelled to reverse a conviction on the grounds of 
prejudicial publicity causing an unfair trial was Commonwealth v. 
Crehan.11s During the trial of that case, a newspaper article appeared 
relating the defendant's prior criminal record after the judge had specifi-
cally warned the press covering the trial that any such disclosure could 
result in a mistrial. liD The judge did not poll the jurors as to whether they 
had been affected by the article, nor did. he immediately warn them to 
disregard it. The defendant's motion for a mistrial was denied.60 The 
court reversed saying that in such circumstances, prompt and forceful 
action was required of the trial court to overcome the prejudicial influ-
ence of the article. 61 The court, in effect, determined that the judge's 
error was manifest. 
Thus, at the time that the decision in Commonwealth v. Stanley was 
appealed, the settled rule in Massachusetts was that the trial judge was 
left much latitude in his handling of cases which were encumbered by 
potentially prejudicial publicity. The practice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court was to ensure that the judge had given prompt and understandable 
instructions to the jury to ignore the extrajudicial material. As long as 
it was felt that these instructions were sufficiently forceful to counteract 
the publicity, the reviewing court would not interfere with the exercise of 
sound judicial discretion. 62 
The majority opinion in Commonwealth v. Stanley is in complete 
conformity with the Massachusetts precedents. The court briefly dis-
cussed the alleged prejudicial newspaper article. It pointed out that the 
story did not disclose a prior criminal record or other criminal activity. 
Further, the court declared that the "characterization of the assault as 
brutal would be unlikely to affect jurors who had heard the victim's 
117 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1464,275 N.E.2d at 97 (emphasis in original). 
118 345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d 925 (1965). 
119 Id. at 610-11, 188 N.E.2d at 924-25. 
eo Id. 
61 Id. at 615, 188 N.E.2d at 927. 
62 This rule is also employed by the Supreme Judicial Court in cases involving (1) 
possible prejudice arising from comments made by counsel: see, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. D'Ambra, 557 Mass. 260, 258 N.E.2d 74 (1970); Commonwealth v. Belakin, 556 Mass. 
547, 254 N.E.2d 422 (1969); Commonwealth v. LePage, 552 Mass. 405, 226 N.E.2d 200 
(1967); and (2) possible prejudice arising from inadmissible testimony: see, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Gordon, 556 Mass. 598, ~4 N.E.2d 901 (1970). 
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testimony"es and the reference to the district court conviction was not 
deemed fatal. Finally, the court found that the presence of the newspaper 
in the jury room did not add significantly to the likelihood of prejudice.8' 
Several questions could be raised with regard to these conclusions on 
the issue of the prejudicial effect of the newspaper article on the jury's 
impartiality. First, although the story did not relate a past criminal 
record per se, the disclosure ·that Stanley had been found guilty in the 
district court on the very same charges might well have been prejudicial. 
As was noted in the dissent,s11 the Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary 
Rules Regulating the Practice of Law,68. which have recently been 
adopted by the court, forbid counsel from making extrajudicial state-
ments which relate to "[t]he character, reputation, or prior criminal 
record (including arrests, indictments, or other charges of crime) of the 
accused."87 Arguably the revelation of a conviction at the district court 
level is within the scope of the rule, and hence the type of information 
that should not reach the jury. The majority opinion stated that "[i]t is 
often difficult if not impossible to conceal from a Superior Court jury the 
fact that there have been prior proceedings in the District Court."68 But 
this argument would seem to be contrary to the spirit of the Canons 
adopted by the court as well as the philosophy underlying the right to a 
trial de novo,69 As a practical matter, the divulgence of the fact that one 
court had already found the defendant guilty of the charges would seem 
likely to bias a jury composed of laymen. Further, the jury was impaneled 
to find if the defendant had committed assault and battery upon a police 
officer'~'0 and the story stated that the defendant was "appealing a District 
Court conviction of assault and battery on State Trooper Richard Stock-
well, who was brutally beaten while on duty . . . ."71 While it is not 
directly stated that Stanley committed the brutal attack, a juror hastily 
reading the story could have easily so inferred. 
Finally, at least four of the jurors had read the article which was in the 
jury room, and a fifth, having learned of it, was desirous of seeing it.72 
One might readily suppose, as Justice Reardon did in his dissent,TB that a 
ea 19711 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 252,292 N.E.2d at 696. 
M Id. at 251-52, 292 N.E.2d at 696. 
811 Id. at 256, 292 N.E.2d at 699 (dissenting opinion). 
68 Supreme Judicial Court Rule 11:22. The Supreme Judicial Court adopted in sub-
stantial content and numbering the canons and rules set out in the ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics (1970). 
6'1' Disciplinary Rule 7-107(B)(l). Id. 
68 19711 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 252, 292 N.E.2d at 696. 
69 See note 4 supra. 
TO See note 11 supra. 
'1'1 Greenfield Recorder, May 25, 1971, at 10, col. 1 (emphasis added). 
'1'2 See note 7 supra. 
78 19711 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 255, 292 N.E.2d at 698 (dissenting opinion). 
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jury room conversation was the source of the fifth juror's knowledge of 
the story. 
Hence at least one-third of the jury had read and possibly discussed an 
article which reflected on the defendant's culpability and revealed that 
another court had found him to be guilty of the charges being tried. 
Such disclosures must lead one to question whether the impartiality of 
the jury that found Stanley guilty had not been so diminished as to 
tarnish the trial's fairness. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, did not enter into a discussion 
of these questions in its opinion. After its cursory review of the possible 
prejudicial effect of the article, the court, as in the earlier cases, refused 
to disturb the trial court's conclusions as to the lack of effect of the preju-
dicial publicity. The court sought to apply the test set out in Beneficial 
Finance to ensure that the trial judge's corrective instructions were suffi-
cient, but found the defendant's bill of exceptions did not include all of 
the instructions given by the judge.74 Utilizing a rule of court,75 the court 
determined that since the defendant did not set out all the instructions, 
no issue was raised as to the adequacy of the instructions76 and there was 
therefore no reason to reverse the trial court's discretionary finding that 
the defendant had not been prejudiced. Hence, the Supreme Judicial 
Court did not even apply its rule to the facts in Stanley. The majority 
opinion in Stanley could be called the progeny of Barker, Eagan and 
Beneficial Finance.77 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Reardon in Commonwealth v. 
Stanley evidences a novel approach, at least by Massachusetts standards, 
to the questions raised. While Justice Reardon quickly distinguished the 
Barker and Eagan cases from the instant case on the facts, 78 and also 
74 Id. at 252, 292 N.E.2d at 696. See text at note 57 supra. 
75 The Supreme Judicial Court Rules are set forth in 351 Mass. 731 (1967). Rule 
1:22 calls for the excepting party to designate "the portions of the ••• instructions ••• 
which he deems necessary for each such exception" included in the Bill of Exceptions. 
351 Mass. at 742. Rule 1:13 states that "[t]he court need not pass upon questions or 
issues not argued in briefs." Id. at 738. See Commonwealth v. Cosolito, 1971 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 809, 269 N.E.2d 679. 
76 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 252, 292 N.E.2d at 696. 
77 It is worth noting that the Supreme Judicial Court employed the "sound judi-
cial discretion" passage from Barker (see text at note 48 supra) and the "prompt, 
clear, and forceful" test from Beneficial Finance (see text at note 57 supra). Id. at 
251-52,292 N.E.2d at 695-96. 
78 Id. at 255, 292 N.E.2d at 698 (dissenting opinion). In Barker, there was no evi-
dence that the articles in question had been read by any of the jurors, !Ill Mass. at 
87, 40 N.E.2d at 268-69, whereas in Stanley, four jurors admitted to reading at least 
part of the Recorder story. See note 7 supra. Reardon distinguished Eagan, 357 Mass. 
585, 259 N.E.2d 548, on the basis that in Stanley the offending jurors saw the news-
paper in the jury room and because it "apparently was the subject of some discussion 
12
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pointed out that the article in Stanley was arguably more prejudicial,'fl 
he nonetheless did not attempt to apply the traditional Massachusetts 
formula for sound judicial discretion upon which the majority so heavily 
rested its decision. 
The significance of this omission is highlighted by a comparison with 
the dissent in a recent Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. De 
Christoforo,so which also involved the question of prejudice affecting 
the jury.st Declaring that "[i]n the circumstances of this case the instruc-
tions were far from sufficient to overcome the serious damage done," 
Chief Justice Tauro dissented to the affirmance of the conviction.82 This 
dissent was couched in terms of the traditional Massachusetts rule for 
reviewing the discretionary actions taken by the trial judge to offset the 
effect of prejudicial material that had reached the jury. The Chief 
Justice did not question the validity of the rule, but rather objected to 
the conclusions reached by the majority after applying it. 
In his dissenting opinion in Stanley, Justice Reardon also forebore 
from a direct attack on the rule, but, unlike Chief Justice Tauro in 
De Christoforo, he did raise serious doubts about its soundness. Refer-
ring to the trial court's inquiry of the jurors, Reardon queried "whether 
jurors are the best judges of their own bias or lack of it."83 Without 
additional comment, he mentioned one of the findings of the Advisory 
Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, of which he was chairman:M 
"It has been established that on inquiry jurors very frequently con-
sciously or unconsciously do not express honestly their reaction to 
offensive material which they may have seen."811 Justice Reardon would 
seem to agree with one commentator's88 view that "[b]y allowing ..• 
jurors to be the judges of their own bias or lack of it, courts have in 
effect abandoned their own responsibility to insure impartial juries."87 
among them." 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 255, 292 N.E.2d at 698 (dissenting opinion). 
Neither factor was present in Eagan. 
'f8 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 255, 292 N.E.2d at 698 (dissenting opinion). The article in 
the present case referred to a past conviction of the defendant in the district court 
on the same charges whereas the articles in Eagan related to an event not pertinent 
to that trial. See note 50 supra. 
so 1971 MaBB. Adv. Sh. 1707, <J:17 N.E.2d 100. 
81 The prejudicial material in De Christoforo consisted of improper arguments 
made by counsel. Id. at 1711, 277 N.E.2d at 105. As was pointed out earlier, the Su-
preme Judicial Court has employed the same rules in cases of this nature. See note 
62 supra. 
82 Id. at 1722, 277 N.E.2d at lll (dissenting opinion). 
83 197!1 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 257, 292 N.E.2d at 699 (diBSenting opinion). 
84 See note 25 supra. 
811 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 258, 292 N.E.2d at 699 (dissenting opinion). See ABA 
Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and 
Free Press 56-57 (Tent. Draft, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Tentative Draft of Standards]. 
86 J. Lofton, Justice and the Press (1966), cited in 197!1 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 257, 292 
N.E.2d at 699 (dissenting opinion). 
87 J. Lofton, supra note 86, at !129. 
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Reardon also questioned the efficacy of the judge's instructions to the 
jury to disregard the prejudicial material. Departing from the Massa-
chusetts rule, as laid out in the Beneficial Finance case, he stated: "The 
adequacy of cautionary instructions in this type of case is always ques-
tionable and, in fact, the likelihood of harm to the defendant may even 
increase with such instructions."88 
Hence, Justice Reardon, while not expressly stating his disapproval of 
the test employed so consistently by the Supreme Judicial Court, clearly 
proceeded to attack the underpinnings of the rule. He implied that even 
if the trial judge met the majority's test-that is, gave " 'prompt, clear, 
and forceful instructions to the jury' which 'were hardly susceptible 
of misunderstanding by the jury' and 'were, in the circumstances, 
sufficiently strong to counteract the possible effect of the adverse pub-
licity' "89-the defendant would still be entitled to a mistrial. Justice 
Reardon further declared that "[i]t taxes one's credulity to conclude that 
the article played no part in the deliberations and verdict of the jury."90 
This statement reveals his disdain for the often used presumption that 
the jury will disregard matters withdrawn from their consideration.91 
Moreover, Reardon's statement indicates an apparent belief that the 
court itself should deal directly with the question of whether "the de-
fendant's right to an impartial trial ... was gravely imperilled by 
extrinsic material • . • ,"92 and not merely consider the issue of how 
effective were the trial court's attempts to offset the appearance of the 
prejudicial material. Though at first blush it might seem that the only 
difference between these questions is one of semantics, it is submitted 
that the substitution of the emphasis entirely changes the scope of the 
review undertaken by the appellate court. Whereas Justice Reardon 
would have the court closely examine the existence of prejudice caused to 
the defendant-that is, investigate "whether jurors exposed to the article 
were prejudiced against him by that exposure"93-the court, through a 
mechanical application of the current Massachusetts rule, focuses its 
attention on the adequacy of the judge's attempts to offset the influence. 
Unfortunately, the latter approach would naturally seem to. amount to 
little more than a superficial inspection of the potential prejudicial effect 
upon the defendant's case. 
It would seem obvious to infer that Justice Reardon's approach to 
88 1971J Mass. Adv. Sh. at 258, 292 N.E.2d at 699 (dissenting opinion). 
89 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 252, 292 N.E.2d at 696, quoting from Commonwealth v. 
Beneficial Fin. Co., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1!167, 1464, 275 N.E.2d !Ill, 97. 
oo 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 258, 292 N.E.2d at 700 (dissenting opinion). 
91 See text at note 54 supra. This presumption was employed in EAgan, !157 Mass. 
585, 259 N.E.2d 548 (1970), and in Beneficial Finance, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1!167, 275 
N.E.2d !Ill. 
112 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 25!1, 292 N.E.2d at 697 (dissenting opinion). 
98 Id. at 256,292 N.E.2d at 698 (dissenting opinion). 
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the problem of the effect of prejudicial publicity upon the defendant's 
right to a fair trial was, at least in part, influenced by his work with the 
Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press."' That Committee 
studied this very problem and made extensive findings,811 including the 
following: 
The Committee believes, on the basis of all [the] evidence, as well 
as the natural inferences dictated by judgment and experience, 
that there is indeed a substantial danger of an unfair trial when 
potentially prejudicial information reaches the eyes or ears of the 
trier of fact. The law requires, in order to protect the innocent, that 
the state ~tablish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of 
competent, admissible evidence. The likelihood that this burden may 
be substantially lessened ••• because of the conscious or unconscious 
effect of extrajudicial reports seems far too great to be ignored.88 
Specifically, the Committee concluded that the possibility that extraneous 
material may prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial is at its 
greatest during the time a publicized case is actually being tried.8' 
Stanley, of course, was appealing on the ground that extrajudicial infor-
mation had reached the jury during the trial and had thus prejudiced 
his right to a fair trial. 
Reardon's participation with the Advisory Committee undoubtedly 
raised his awareness of the serious problems inherent in the fair trial/ 
free press question, and served as a factor in his apparent abandonment 
of the formula employed by the majority in Stanley. But a clearer under-
standing of Justice Reardon's dissent is afforded by an inspet:tion of the 
recent trend in decisions handed down by the United States Supreme 
Court in cases involving extrajudicial material which had allegedly preju-
diced a defendant's case. 
In Marshall v. United States,es seven jurors had read articles referring 
to the defendant's previous felony convictions, but, when the judge 
inquired concerning possible prejudice, they all professed their ability 
to decide the case solely on the evidence presented in court. The Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction with the following language: 
The trial judge has a large discretion in ruling on the issue of 
prejudice resulting from the reading by jurors of news articles con-
cerning the trial. • . . Generalizations beyond that statement are 
not profitable, because each case must tum on its special facts. We 
have here the exposure of jurors to information of a character which 
tl4 See note 25 supra. 
811 Tentative Draft of Standards, supra note 85, puahn. 
116 Id. at 66. 
87 Id. at 40, 92. 
98 !160 u.s. !110 (1959). 
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the trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly 
offered as evidence. The prejudice to the defendant is almost certain 
to be as great when that evidence reaches the jury through news 
accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution's evidence .... It 
may indeed be greater for it is then not tempered by protective 
procedures. 99 
Hence, the Court, looking at the case's own "special fads," overturned 
the conviction purely because of the prejudice engendered by the news-
paper articles appearing during the trial, and without considering 
whether the curative instructions given by the trial judge were adequate 
to counteract this prejudicial effect. However, the case was not decided 
specifically on constitutional grounds, but rather, it manifested "the 
exercise of . . . supervisory power to formulate and apply proper stan-
dards for enforcement of the criminal law in the federal courts,"100 and as 
such was not directed expressly to the states. Yet Marshall was a warning 
to the American judiciary that the Supreme Court was breaking from its 
traditional pattern of limited review and that it intended, in cases con-
cerning prejudicial publicity, to examine more carefully the defendant's 
specific claims. 
Two years later, in Irvin v. Dowd,101 the Supreme Court reversed for 
the first time a state criminal conviction on the grounds of unfair preju-
dicial publicity. Cited by the Court was the "pattern of deep and bitter 
prejudice," engendered in part by publicity and present throughout the 
community, which so biased the jury as to render the defendant's trial 
unfair in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process.102 
Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, did not explicitly impose the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury upon the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, but he certainly implied that such 
a ruling could be forthcoming in the future. "In essence, the right to a 
jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of 
impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair 
hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process."103 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter, while speaking of the 
press, perhaps most clearly indicated the Court's new and growingly 
acrimonious attitude towards prejudicial publicity: 
99 Id. at 512-1!1. 
100 Id. at !11!1. 
101 !166 U.S. 717 (1961). This case involved, predominantly, pre-trial publicity, and 
as such the facts are not necessary for thJs oomment. The Court's opinion, however, fore-
shadowed the treatment to be given in cases involving prejudicial publicity appearing 
during the triaL For an acoount of thJs case, see D. Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial 
9-12 (1966). 
102 !166 U.S. at 727-28. 
103 Id. at 722. 
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This court has not yet decided that the fair administration of crim-
inal justice must be subordinated to another safeguard of our con-
stitutional system-freedom of the press, properly conceived. The 
Court has not yet decided that, while convictions must be reversed 
and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors ... 
were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying 
his trade.104 
In the years immediately ·following the Iroin decision the Supreme 
Court twice reaffirmed the stance taken in that landmark case. In Rideau 
v. Louisiana1ors and Estes v. Texas,1os the Court struck down convictions 
declaring that media publicity had denied the defendant, in each case, 
due process of law as guaranteed generally by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Though the Court still did not explicitly incorporate the right to 
trial by an impartial jury to the states, the decisions seemed to presume 
that an impartial jury was an essential element of due process. 
During the same period a non-judicial source called attention to the 
problems faced by an accused in obtaining a fair trial when there is 
much media coverage of the crime. The Report of the Presidential Com-
mission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (commonly 
known as the Warren Report) declared that Lee Harvey Oswald, if he had 
lived, never would have been able to receive a fair trial due to the 
massive saturation of publicity that emanated from Dallas in the hours 
following President Kennedy's death.107 The Warren Report strongly 
urged that reforms be instituted: 
The experience in Dallas during November 22-24 is a dramatic 
affirmation of the need for steps to bring about a proper balance 
between the right of the public to be kept informed and the right of 
the individual to a fair and impartial trial.10s 
In 1966, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions that served to 
104 Id. at 730 (concurring opinion). 
105 1173 u.s. 723 (1963). 
106 381 U.S. 532 (1965). In Estes, the televising of the defendant's trial prompted 
the Court to say: 
It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process deprivations we re-
quire a showing of identifiable prejudice to the defendant. Nevertheless, at times 
a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will 
result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process. 
Id. at 542-43. For the Supreme Court's traditional requirements, see note ll4 supra. 
107 Report of the Presidential Commission on the Assassination of President John 
F. Kennedy 2118 (1964). See generally id. at 201-42. 
108 Id. at 242. One immediate response to the Warren Report was the formation 
by the American Bar Association of the Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free 
Press under the direction of Justice Reardon. See note 25 supra. 
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clarify ambiguities in its position on the issue of prejudicial publicity 
and the right to a fair trial. One was Parker v. Gladden,lOD where the 
Court expressly made the right to a trial by an impartial jury as com-
manded by "the Sixth Amendment ... applicable to the States through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."110 The implica-
tion inherent in Iroin, Rideau and Estes was finally and clearly stated to 
be the law of the land. The obligation to give a defendant a trial by an 
impartial jury was now placed upon the states.m 
In perhaps its clearest exposition on the subject, the Supreme Court 
met the problem of an accused attempting to obtain a fair trial in the face 
of prejudicial publicity in Sheppard v. Maxwell.112 In a carefully worded 
opinion, Justice Clark depicted the massive prejudicial publicity, both 
pre-trial and during the trial, as well as the trial judge's inadequate 
handling of the resulting problems which precluded Sheppard from 
receiving a fair trial.11a Then, the Court concluded its opinion by ad-
dressing itself generally to the problems raised by prejudicial publicity 
and issued a clarion call for reform. 
From the cases coining here we note that unfair and prejudicial 
news comment on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. 
Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial 
jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern 
communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity 
from the Ininds of the jurors, the trial courts ~ust take strong 
measures to insure that the balance is never weighed against the 
accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an inde-
pendent evaluation of the circumstances. . . . If publicity during 
the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should 
be ordered.ll' 
These principles are unparalleled in their clarity and stringency. The 
Court definitively declared that in order to meet due process require-
ments a defendant's trial had to be by an impartial jury, and the burden 
108 !185 U.S. 368 (1966). Parker involved highly prejudicial comments by the court's 
bailiff to the individual jurors. 
110 Id. at 364. 
111 Prior to Parker, the Supreme Court had required the States under the Sixth 
Amendment to give a criminal defendant (I) a public trial, In re Oliver, 888 U.S. 257 
(1948); and (2) a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, !186 U.S. 218 (1967). 
112 !184 U.S. 585 (1966). For accounts of this case, see D. Gillmor, supra note 101, 
at 1-9; F. Bailey, The Defense Never Rests 65-114: (1971). 
118 !184 U.S. at 857-68. 
114 Id. at 862-68. Clark also discussed the issue of pre-trial publicity: "[W]here 
there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior tO trial will prevent a fair 
trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to an-
other county not so permeated with publicity." Id. at 868. 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/16
492 1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §15.1 
was placed directly on the trial judge to ensure the fairness of the pro-
ceedings.1111 
The Court in Sheppard sounded the final death knell for the tradi-
tional practice that had emanated from the old rule that "the finding of 
the trial court .•. ought not to be set aside ••. unless the error is mani-
fest"118 in cases involving potential prejudicial publicity when it said 
"appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of 
the circumstances."117 The Supreme Court was explicitly stating that a 
review concentrating on the trial judge's curative instructions would not 
suffice; that there has to be a complete examination of the totality of the 
circumstances, which would include what the defendant claims to be 
the prejudicial material and its resulting effect upon his case.11B 
But perhaps the most significant principle set forth in the Sheppard 
opinion is that the trial judge should grant a new trial if "publicity 
during the proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial ..•• "119 Whereas 
the Court had previously spoken of preventing the probability of unfair-
ness,120 the Sheppard decision declared that henceforth publicity was not 
to be permitted even to threaten the trial's fairness. Thus, the Supreme 
Court was seemingly curtailing the threshold of permissible prejudicial 
effect during a trial, or, to phrase it another way, the obligation placed 
upon the states to meet the due process requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment while trying a criminal defendant was enlarged. Indeed, 
when there is extrajudicial publicity which is actually prejudicial to the 
defendant, one might wonder whether, under the Sheppard guidelines, 
curative measures by the judge can ever counteract that effect so as to 
remove the threat of unfairness. It seems certain that the Supreme Court 
did not intend to make all publicity, no matter how slight the prejudice 
to the defendant's case, grounds for an automatic mistrial, but it does 
appear safe, after Sheppard, to say that when publicity which is severely 
prejudicial to the defendant reaches the jury, the right to a fair trial by 
an impartial jury will have been denied, regardless of the strength of 
the remedial instructions, and therefore a new trial will be in order. 
It was the American Bar Association Advisory Committee on Fair Trial 
1111 The Court's stern criticism of Judge Blythin's handling of the Sheppard trial 
indicated the seriousness with which this expectation was held. 
118 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878). 
111 384 U.S. at !162. 
118 Moreover, citing Estes v. Texas, !181 U.S. 5!12 (1965), the Supreme Court indi-
cated that in cases of extreme publicity even an actual showing of prejudice may not 
be required as the proceedings will be deemed inherently unfair from the totality of 
the circumstances. !184 U.S. at !152-55. See note 106 supra. See also Comment, 8 Wm. 
Be Mary L. Rev. 14!1 (1966). 
119 !184 U.S. at !16!1 (emphasis added). 
12o "But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability 
of unfairness." In re Murchison, !149 U.S. 1!1!1, 1!16 (1955). 
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and Free Press which probably best summarized the series of Supreme 
Court decisions climaxed by Sheppard: 
Perhaps the most important aspect of these decisions is that they 
herald a departure from the traditional view that the discretion of 
the trial judge with regard to these questions is extremely broad 
and that actual prejudice, not simply the likelihood of harm, must be 
shown in order it obtain relief,l21 
Thus, Justice Reardon's dissent in Commonwealth v. Stanley had sub-
stantial case law to support it. Though his approach, which emphasizes 
the prejudicial effect upon the jury's impartiality and upon the defen-
dant's case, may be novel by Massachusetts standards, it certainly is con-
sistent with the recent Supreme Court decisions. 
Further, Justice Reardon's dissent, when read in light of these recent 
Supreme Court decisions, can be interpreted on two levels. Initially, the 
justice is protesting the majority's decision in the case before the court. 
But his dissent also seems to contain a latent exhortation to the court to 
revise its policy in reviewing convictions alleged to be defective due to 
prejudicial publicity. 
On the first level, Reardon is arguing that a mistrial should have been 
granted in Stanley. 
It may well have been that his victim was "brutally beaten," as the 
newspaper said and as one-third of the jury read, but he was entitled 
to a trial under the Sixth Amendment untainted by the introduction 
of such an article in the jury room .... The defendant was entitled 
to a fair trial. He did not get it. A mistrial should have been 
declared.m 
On the second and more significant level is Reardon's thinly veiled 
suggestion that the Supreme Judicial Court reject its traditional formula 
for cases involving the question of prejudicial publicity and the right to a 
fair trial. This is best indicated by the justice's refusal to apply the test 
in Stanley as well as by the questions he raises concerning the efficacy of 
inquiries and instructions to the jury.128 He maintains that a mistrial 
should have been declared, not on the basis of inadequate curative mea-
sures, but, rather, because "the defendant's right to an impartial trial 
under the Sixth Amendment . . . was gravely imperilled • • • .''1M This 
would certainly seem to be the Sheppard "threatens the fairness" test in 
121 Tentative Draft of Standards, supra note 85, at 112. 
122 197S Mass. Adv. Sh. at 258-59, 292 N.E.2d at 700 (dissenting opinion). 
128 See text at notes B!J-9!J supra. 
1:u 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 25!1, 292 N.E.2d at 697 (disaenting opinion). 
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practice.m Additionally, Reardon cites the Advisory Committee's con-
clusion that the recent Supreme Court cases have departed from rules of 
broad discretion128 and quotes the Sheppard requirement that the appel-
late courts undertake an independent evaluation of the prejudice in the 
case.127 Reardon concludes his opinion with the statement that "[u]nder 
the Sixth Amendment • . • there are serious questions attached to the 
verdict in the case."128 One could well imagine him adding that under 
the Sixth Amendment there are serious questions attached to the rule 
employed by the Supreme Judicial Court in cases involving prejudicial 
publicity. 
It would seem that a critical examination of the formula applied in 
Massachusetts is in order.1211 The Supreme Judicial Court has tradi-
tionally left to the trial court's discretion the question of whether the 
extrajudicial material is so prejudicial to the defendant's case as to 
require a mistrial. The court has preferred to concentrate on the actions 
taken by the judge to offset the effects of the publicity deemed to be 
potentially prejudicial. In particular, the court has inquired into the 
immediacy, forcefulness and clarity of the instructions given by the judge 
to the jury. If the court found that the curative measures were adequate, 
it presumed that the jury would adhere to those instructions. Having 
found no manifest error, the court would affirm and not interfere with 
the exercise of the judge's sound judicial discretion. 
The most distinctive aspect of the Massachusetts procedure is that the 
court places greater emphasis on reviewing the judge's instructions than 
on examining the effect of the prejudicial material on the defendant's 
rights. The latitude left to the judge is partly due to the proximity of 
the trial judge to the extraneous matter and thus his greater ability to 
determine its alleged effect upon the jurors. Yet when one realizes that 
the defendant is appealing his conviction, in most cases on the grounds 
that he was denied a fair trial due to the prejudice which tarnished the 
jurors' impartiality, it would appear logical, if not mandatory, that the 
primary focus of attention be the extrajudicial material and the resulting 
prejudicial effect upon the jurors. The real question would seem to be 
"whether jurors exposed to the article were prejudiced against him by 
that exposure,"180 as Justice Reardon suggested. The Sheppard opinion 
places the obligation upon the appellate court to "make an independent 
1211 Though Justice Reardon apeaka only of the Sixth Amendment. one may lliiUIIle 
he is applying it to Massachusetts through the due proce1111 clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as mandated in Parker v. Gladden, !185 U.S. ll6!1 (1966). 
128 See text at note 121 supra. 
127 See text at note 114 supra. 
128 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 258, 292 N.E.2d at 700 (diaenting opinion). 
1211 For discuasion concerning the development of the rule followed in Maaachu-
setta, see text at notea 41-62 supra. 
180 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 256,292 N.E.2d at 698 (dissenting opinion). 
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evaluation of the circumstances."181 It is submitted that this requires a 
fresh and complete examination of the potentially prejudicial publicity 
and its effect upon the impartiality of the jurors. 
Further, there are serious questions as to whether the stress placed by 
the Supreme Judicial Court upon the adequacy of the trial court's in-
structions is warranted. The United States Supreme Court in certain 
cases of flagrant prejudice has intimated that any and all instructions 
would be insufficient to rectify the damage done by the inherent bias.182 
At least one commentator perceives the recent Supreme Court decisions 
as suggesting "that less confidence is being placed in the efficacy of cau-
tionary instructions to combat prejudicial publicity occurring before or 
during a trial."188 Indeed a close reading of Justice Clark's opinion in 
Sheppard v. Maxwell184 might lead one to believe that the Court had 
rejected remedial instructions as effective means by which to protect a 
defendant's right to a fair trial.181i It should be noted that the opinion 
said "(d]ue process requires that the accused receive a trial by an im-
partial jury free from outside influences."186 If the Court had said free 
from the prejudicial effects of outside influences, one might justifiably 
argue that the Court was including the successfulness of the trial judge's 
instructions in minimizing the effects of the publicity as one of the 
considerations of the appellate court's review. But the actual choice of 
words by the Court could well indicate that the view held by the justices 
is that the adequacy of the remedial instructions is not a relevant factor 
in determining if the defendant's due process rights have been denied. 
Moreover, as was indicated earlier,18T the Court declared that "[i]f 
publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a 
new trial should be ordered."188 Notable only by its absence is the sug-
gestion that, if publicity threatens the trial's fairness, the judge should 
issue immediate and forceful instructions to the jury to disregard the 
prejudicial publicity. 
Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United 
States,1B9 declared that "the naive assumption that prejudicial effects can 
be overcome by instructions to the jury ..• all practicing lawyers know 
to be unmitigated fiction."HO Whether or not remedial instructions can 
181 !184 U.S. at !162. 
182 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, !184 U.S. !133 (1966); Estes v. Texas, ll81 U.S. 532 
(1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, !175 U.S. 721 (196!1); Irvin v. Dowd, 566 U.S. 717 (1961). 
See also note 118 supra. 
188 D. Gillmor, supra note 101, at 159. 
184 !184 U.S. 5!15 (1966). 
1811 See ll84 U.S. at !162-63. 
188 !184 U.S. at !162 (emphasis added). 
181 See text at notes 119-20 supra. 
188 !184 U.S. at !165. 
189 3!16 u.s. 440 (1948). 
140 Id. at 455 (roncurring opinion). 
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ever really counteract extrajudicial prejudice, it does seem valid to con-
clude that the "simple truth is that judicial warnings to jurors are not 
enough to insure fair trials."141 
Every defendant in a criminal proceeding in Massachusetts has the 
constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury as commanded by the 
Sixth Amendment and made applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment due process clause.142 It is incumbent upon the 
Supreme Judicial Court, as the highest court of the Commonwealth, to 
ensure that no defendant is ever denied ·this right which is so essential to 
fundamental fairness. In proceeding with this task, it is submitted, it 
would behoove the court to reconsider its traditional policy in reviewing 
convictions alleged to be defective due to prejudicial publicity. Specifi-
cally, it is urged that when such a case comes up on appeal, the Supreme 
Judicial Court should undertake a fresh and complete appraisal of the 
total circumstances, seeking to determine if the extrajudicial material 
sufficiently diminished the impartiality of the jurors to render the de-
fendant's trial constitutionally unfair. The adequacy of the trial court's 
remedial instructions might be one factor in this evaluation, but the con-
trolling consideration must be the effect of the prejudicial matter upon 
the jurors' deliberations of the case. 
KENNETH S. PRINCE 
§13.2. Due process and the right to a fair trial: Questions regarding 
racial prejudice during voir dire: Commonwealth v. Ross.1 Ross and co-
defendants, all black, were charged with armed robbery, assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon with intent to murder, and assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon.2 The victim of the crime was 
a white security guard at Boston University. 
At Ross's trial, his attorney requested that prospective jurors be asked 
questions designed to elicit possible biases. His counsel was particularly 
concerned with prejudice against blacks as well as juror bias favoring 
people in police . work. The judge was not insensitive to this request. 
He asked the veniremen whether they or any of their relatives had ever 
done police work.8 He further told the jury that they must be impartial 
and base their verdict upon the evidence and not on any bias Qr preju-
dice. An additional question requested by the attorney, but rejected by 
the judge was: "Are there any of you who believe that a white person 
is more likely to be telling the truth than a black person?" The judge 
141 J. Lofton, Justice and the Press !129 (1966). 
142 See Parker v. Gladden, !85 U.S. !16!1 (1966), discussed in text at notes 109-11 
supra. 
§1!1.2. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 87!1, 282 N.E.2d 70, judgment vacated and remanded, 
410 U.S. 901 (197!1), 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 8!19, 296 N.E.2d 810. 
2 Id. at 841, 296 N.E.2d at 812. 
a Id. at 841-42, 296 N.E.2d at 812-18. 
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did inquire whether any special circumstances existed that necessitated 
such a question, but the only reason mentioned was the fact that the 
defendants were black and the victim white. Though acknowledging 
the problem, he nevertheless refused to ask any specific questions about 
racial bias on the grounds that people with the "disease of bias" are the 
last to admit it and that consequently no purpose would be served by 
asking such a question.' 
In response to the questions that were asked, several jurors did raise 
their hands to indicate possible bias, and the judge questioned them 
individually. One prospective juror was excused because of admitted 
racial prejudice, two were excused for unspecified prejudice. Seven were 
excused because they had formed an opinion about the case, and an 
additional eight had connections with police work or with the university 
where the alleged crime occurred.11 Ross was convicted of the crimes 
charged, which conviction was upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
He appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the United States 
on the ground that the trial judge's refusal to ask questions about racial 
prejudice violated his federal constitutional rights and required reversal 
of the conviction. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, 
vacated the judgment and remanded the case6 for further consideration 
in light of Ham v. South Carolina.7 In Ham, the Supreme Court had 
determined that the trial judge's refusal to examine jurors on voir dire 
as to possible prejudice against Ham violated his federal constitutional 
rights. Ham was a young black prominently associated with groups ad-
vocating racial equality. Although never previously convicted of a 
crime he was convicted of possession of marihuana. His defense was 
that because of his civil rights work, he had been framed by the police 
on the drug charge. 8 
The issue presented to the court by this remand was whether the 
trial judge's refusal to ask veniremen if they were racially prejudiced 
was a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
.to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed 
its former determination and HELD: the Ham decision did not, in 
this case, dictate that the trial judge was constitutionally required to 
question prospective jurors specifically concerning their possible racial 
prejudices beyond the comments and questions that were put to them.9 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Ross was based upon a 
narrow reading of the Ham decision. Asserting that Ham was a special 
target of racial prejudice and that Ross was not, the Supreme Judicial 
4 Id. at 842-4!1, n.7, 296 N.E.2d at 81!1-14 n.7. 
II Id. at 844-45, 296 N.E.2d at 815. 
6 410 u.s. 901 (197!1). 
1 409 u.s. 524 (197!1). 
8 409 U.S. at 525. 
9 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 846, 296 N.E.2d at 816. 
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Court attempted to distinguish the Ham case on its facts. To bolster 
this distinction, the court pointed to language in the Ham decision 
which appeared to circumscribe the holding to "the facts shown by this 
record."10 The Massachusetts court further found that the test of funda-
mental fairness, required by Ham, had been met in Ross. 
This comment will examine the Supreme Court's decision in Ham v. 
South Carolina to determine what constitutional requirements are im-
posed upon a state's juror selection process. The Ross decision will then 
be analyzed to determine if the court properly applied the requirements 
of Ham. The impact of this decision on Massachusetts law will also be 
considered. Finally, the Ross decision will be criticized and an alterna-
tive test suggested. 
In general, recent Supreme Court cases pose two questions when seek-
ing to determine constitutional requirements in state criminal proceed-
ings:11 first, what guidelines are provided in the Bill of Rights; and 
second, are such requirements binding in state proceedings. Constitu-
tional requirements with regard to jury selection might be similarly 
determined. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." The 
Supreme Court has held that to enforce the right to an impartial jury 
the defendant should be allowed to inquire into possible prejudices of 
prospective jurors.12 
Accepting the notion that the Sixth Amendment requirement of an 
impartial jury includes the right to ask specific questions of jurors, it 
should be asked if that requirement has any force in state proceedings. 
In other words, does Fourteenth Amendment due process include this 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 845, 296 N.E.2d at 815, citing 409 U.S. at 527. 
11 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 567 U.S. 645 (1961); Malloy v. Hogan, 578 U.S. I (1964); 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. '784 (1969). 
12 In Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950), the petitioner was convicted 
of willfully failing to appear before the Committee of Un-American Activities of the 
House of Representatives. He sought to have all government employees excluded 
from the jury as they were subject to discharge for disloyalty to the Government. 
Dennis feared that Government employees would be reluctant to vote for acquittal 
as such action might be interpreted as "sympathetic association" with Communism. 
Id. at 169. On voir dire examination, each juror who was a government employee 
was interrogated in detail about his attitude toward Communists and fear of dis-
charge. While the Court refused to exclude government employees as a class (as the 
jurors individually testified that they could render a fair and impartial verdict), 
it did assert in its opinion that "[p]reservation of the opportunity to prove actual 
bias is a guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury." Id. at 171-72. 
Shortly after it decided Dennis the Court upheld the right on voir dire to question 
government employees with specific reference to the loyalty order. Morford v. United 
States, 559 U.S. 238 (1950) (per curiam). For cases dealing with jury selection in 
general, see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) and Swain v. Alabama, 380 
u.s. 202 (1964). 
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Sixth Amendment requirement? In 1968, in Duncan v. Louisiana1S the 
Supreme Court decided that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a 
right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried 
in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guar~ 
antee.u Louisiana questioned the wisdom of such a holding, and claimed 
that it would obligate the states to comply with all past interpretations 
of the Sixth Amendment-including the requirement of a 12 man jury 
and unanimous verdict. Instead of discrediting Louisiana's basic assum~ 
tion that all aspects of the Sixth Amendment must now be applied in 
state criminal procedure, Justice White stated that he thought wid~ 
spread changes in state criminal processes would not be needed to bring 
compliance to federal standards. He also pointed out that the Court's 
decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment are always subject to r~ 
consideration and that few states had procedures at variance with Sixth 
Amendment requirements.111 Consequently, although not explicitly stated 
by the Court, this decision has been interpreted as an example of selective 
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth.18 Thus it 
can be said, although not without qualification, that the Sixth Amend~ 
ment is binding on the states in criminal procedures. 
In subsequent decisions, the Court, having the opportunity to reverse 
Duncan and decide that all federal precedents concerning juries were 
not binding on the states, refused to do so. The Court considered the 
need for a twelve person jury panel and held in Williams v. Floridal'l 
that that number was not required by the Sixth Amendment. Two years 
later in Apodaca v. Oregon,ts the Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not require jury unanimity. Although questions were raised as to the 
effect of these decisions on federal criminal procedures, the Court did 
not retreat from its broad ruling in Duncan that the Sixth Amendment 
does apply to the states.19 If incorporation of the Sixth is the rule, a 
dilemma results. Either federal criminal trials no longer require twelve 
13 391 u.s. 145 (1968). 
u Id. at 149. 
111 Id. at 158-59 n.30. 
18 See, e.g., the Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 93, 149 (1968). 
17 399 u.s. 78 (1970). 
18 406 u.s. 404 (1972). 
19 In a companion case to Apodaca, Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), 
Jwdce Powell concurred with the judgment of the Court that convictions based 
on a less than unanimow verdict did not deprive the defendants of due process of law 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, Id. at 366. He rejected the notion that all Sixth 
Amendment requirements applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
at 369. (concurring opinion). Nevertheless, Jwtice Brennan reaffirmed the fact that 
the majority of the Court remains of the view that the Sixth Amendment's jury 
trial guarantee, however it is to be construed, has identical application against both 
state and federal governments. Id. at 395-96 (dissenting opinion). 
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persons nor a unanimous verdict, or else a watered down Bill of Rights 
is to apply to the states.2o Since the Court could have avoided this un-
desirable result. by reversing Duncan, its failure to do so indicates con-
tinued support for incorporation of the Sixth Amendment into the 
Fourteenth. 
Had the Supreme Court chosen to rely on these incorporation cases 
to decide Ham, it could easily have reversed the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina by citing Duncan, the Sixth Amendment requirement of an 
impartial jury, and the cases interpreting this Amendment. Although the 
two recent decisions discussed above have limited constitutional require-
ments for juries,21 the inquiry into juror prejudice is arguably more firmly 
rooted in the constitution.22 Whereas a search of eighteenth century prac-
tice is inconclusive on the issues whether unanimity or jury size were 
intended by the framers of the Constitution to be encompassed by the 
Sixth Amendment,2a the wording of the amendment itself indicates 
impartiality is a constitutional requirement. Consequently, recourse to 
the Sixth Amendment and to Duncan could have provided an adequate 
rationale for the decision that was actually reached in Ham.24 
However, the Supreme Court did not follow such an easy, well-trodden 
path. In Ham, Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court, 
mentioned neither Duncan nor the Sixth Amendment nor incorporation. 
Instead, he based his decision on the demands of "essential fairness 
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"211 
and on the facts evidenced in the record. Thus. he did not set up a flat 
rule that certain questions are required in a particular case, such as 
questions about racial prejudice where the defendant is black. He ex-
amined the facts on the record and made a determination on the fairness 
of the result. 
Few criteria are mentioned to help one determine what is or is not 
required by "essential fairness." But race is clearly afforded a special 
status. This is evidenced in part by the Court's strong reliance on Aldrich 
v. United States,28 a case tried in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia. In Aldrich, the defendant, a black, was accused 
of killing a white police officer. Mentioning only the difference in race 
of the victim and the defendant, Aldrich's counsel requested that the 
20 Justice Douglas's dissent in Johnson v. Louisiana, evidences this concern. 406 
U.S. at !186-87. 
21 Williams v. Florida, !199 U.S, 78 (1970): Apodaca v. Loufaiana, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
22 Mac Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional 
Right, !19 Brooklyn L Rev. 290, 294-96 (1972). 
28 Apodaca v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 404, 408-10 (1972). 
24 It is assumed that voir dire as interpreted in Dennis and Morford are con-
stitutionally required. See note 10 supra. 
211 409 U.S. at 527. 
28 28!1 u.s. !108 (1981). 
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prospective jurors be questioned about racial prejudice.27 The Court 
found that the question was material, as such a prejudice would dis-
qualify a juror, for it would preclude an impartial verdict.28 To support 
this reasoning, the Court mentioned state court decisions holding that 
the fact that the defendant was a black required special inquiry into 
racial prejudice of potential jurors. While Aldrich, as well as most of 
the cases cited in it, involved capital crimes, the Court in Aldrich did 
not base its decision on this factor nor did it indicate any other dis-
tinguishing racial aspect of the case other than the fact that the defendant 
was black.29 Relying on this precedent, the Ham Court found that the 
inquiry as to racial prejudice had "constitutional stature" thus requiring 
questions about discrimination, at least on the facts of that case.80 High-
lighting this concern with racial prejudice is the Court's reference to 
one of the principal purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment-to pro-
hibit the states from invidiously discriminating on the basis of race.81 
Further evidence of the Court's particular concern with questions of 
race is revealed in its treatment of another potential area of preju-
dice. Ham wore a beard and had sought to have the judge inquire 
whether the jurors would "disregard the fact that this defendant wears 
a beard in deciding this case."32 Such requests are not without precedent. 
Cases noted in Aldrich presented a range of possible prejudice sufficient 
to exclude a potential juror from participating in the tria1.33 Justice 
Douglas in his dissenting opinion argued that prejudice to hair growth 
is unquestionably of a "serious character,'' as it may reflect social and 
possibly political values.84 He further reasoned that non-conventional 
hair growth may represent a personal threat to supporters of the status 
quo and may thus evoke prejudice in an individual called for jury 
duty.811 One might consider that questions about beards are frivolous 
and consequently conclude that beardedness is not a focal point of prej-
udice, but the Court did not rule out the question on that ground. In-
21 Id. at 310. 
28 Id. at 311. 
29 Id. at 311-13. 
so 409 U.S. at 528. 
81 Id. at 527. 
82 Id. at 525 n.2. 
88 Bias against squatters was held to be an area of possible juror prejudice re-
quiring questioning. Watson v. Whitney, 23 CaL 375, 379 (1863). Where the defendants 
were Mexican and on trial for assault with intent to murder, questioning jurors 
about membership in the Know Nothing Party was held to be essential for a fair 
trial. People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349 (1855). In the trial of an alleged Communist, 
the United States Supreme Court upheld the right to question potential jurors as to 
whether a Government "loyalty order" would prejudice their verdict. Morford v. 
United States, 339 U.S. 259 (1950) (per curiam). 
84 409 U.S. at 529-30 (dissenting opinion). 
811 409 U.S. at 530 (dissenting opinion). 
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stead, it distinguished its requirement that inquiry be made into racial 
prejudice on the basis that "inquiry as to racial prejudice derives its 
constitutional stature from the firmly established precedent of Aldrich 
and the numerous state cases upon which it relied, and from a principal 
purpose as well as from the language of those who adopted the Four-
teenth Amendment."B6 It is therefore quite clear that racial prejudice is 
afforded a unique status, apart from other kinds of bias, and must be 
considered when questioning potential jurors. 
But the question posed in the Ross case was whether the race of the 
defendant, without other special circumstances, was sufficient to require 
an inquiry into the racial prejudice of prospective 'jurors. Despite the 
United States Supreme Court's focus on the issue of race, the Supreme 
Judicial Court thought the defendant's race alone did not demand in-
quiry, believing Justice Rehnquist had carefully limited the language of 
the Court's opinion to the special circumstances of the case. Conse-
quently, Chief Justice Tauro of the Supreme Judicial Court emphasized 
the factual distinctions between the two cases. He cited Ham's reputation 
for civil rights work and noted that these activities focused on the issue 
of racial prejudice and were allegedly the real cause of his arrest. Ham, 
because of his activities and his race, was tagged a "prominent target" 
for racial bias, but Ross could not point to any reason why he too was 
a special target. To rationalize the Supreme Coiat's grant of certiorari, 
the Supreme Judicial Court in part noted that Ross's petition "carefully 
excluded the judge's comments, remarks and questions to the prospective 
jurors."BT These elements, the Massachusetts court reasoned, evidenced 
the fairness of the proceeding. 
While this decision takes a very narrow view of the requirement in 
Ham# it cannot be said flatly that the Supreme Judicial Court has mis-
read the case.88 The Ham decision does not purport to lay down an 
absolute rule that race or any other area of prejudice must always be 
a subject of inquiry. It only states that race is an historically sensitive 
area and it guardedly holds that, on the facts before the Court, reversal 
was required. While Aldrich may be read to require inquiry into racial 
prejudices in all circumstances where the defendant is black and his 
86 Id. at 528. 
87 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 841 n.4, 296 N.E.2d at 813 n.4. 
88 Generally, other state c:ourts have permitted questions about racial prejudice 
and have found failure to do so reversible error. See Annot., 54 A.LR.2d 1204 (1957). 
Since the 1930's, federal c:ourts have been under the Aldrich rule requiring inquiry 
into racial prejudice, yet those that have faced the iiiSue after Ham have generally 
interpreted, it to be a re-emphasis of the mandate to inquire about racial prejudice. 
United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Robinson, 
485 F.2d 1157 (M Cir. 197!1). If the Supreme Court in Ham had taken a selective 
inc:orporation approach as outlined above, the Ross case would probably have been 
reversed. Application of a test of impartiality as interpreted in Dennis, Morford and 
Aldrich would have required this result. 
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alleged victim white, the Ham Court, although relying on the case and 
finding race to be an area of special concern, confined its holding to 
the facts on the record and a test of fairness. Thus the mere presence of 
a black defendant does not call for particular questions on voir dire. 
Although Ham clearly interprets the Constitution in this manner, this 
reasoning could be questioned. A person who is prejudiced against blacks 
will not discriminate between those who belong to black organizations 
and those who do not. Blacks in either category could equally be the 
targets of intolerance. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court 
seemed reluctant to extend its holding in Ham beyond the facts of that 
case, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court can at least be said 
not to have contravened Ham directly in Ross. 
In addition, if one applies a test of fairness, further factual differences 
between the Ham and Ross cases do appear. In Ham, the trial judge 
refused to ask any questions other than those statutorily required.89 In 
Ross, on the other hand, the judge seemed sincerely concerned about 
juror bias. In addition to the required questions he made inquiry about 
peculiar facets of the case when he thought a response would be forth-
coming. His refusal to ask questions about racial prejudice was based 
on an anticipation that the result would he fruitless and a finding that 
there existed no peculiar racial aspect to the case.4o In addition, as the 
Supreme Judicial Court noted, the trial judge wisely decided not to call 
the defendants by their Muslim names.41 While the judge probably mis-
calculated how jurors would respond to questions about racial prejudice, 
on balance the proceedings met the test of essential fairness. Had the 
Supreme Court used the incorporation analysis outlined above, the Ross 
decision would be less supportable. Cases interpreting the Sixth Amend-
ment, which under incorporation would be applied to the states, require 
inquiry into racial prejudice on the mere showing that the defendant is 
black. This discrepancy further emphasizes the split between federal and 
state requirements, the state being permitted to apply a watered-down 
version of the Sixth Amendment. 
The holding in Ross is consistent with years of Massachusetts deci-
sions. Massachusetts voir dire is covered by G.L. c. 234, §28, which 
directs the judge, or attorney under the direction of the court, to ex-
amine those called as jurors as to whether they are related to either 
party, have any interest in the case, or have expressed or formed an 
opinion or are "sensible" of any bias or prejudice. The statute also 
directs the court to find a substitute for each juror who does not stand 
indifferent in the case. Decisions reported since 1834 have upheld the 
judge's discretion to refuse to ask additional questions inquiring into 
89 409 U.S. at 525-26 n.2. 
40 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 842-44, 296 N.E.2d at 813-15. 
41 Id. 
30
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/16
504 1978 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §18.2 
more specific areas of prejudice,42 regardless of whether the bias com-
plained of was religious,u racial,44 or an opinion about insanity.411 
Although the Ross holding itself breaks virtually no new ground in 
Massachusetts law, the court has pointed the way for limited reform.46 
The Supreme Judicial Court formulated a prospective rule which im-
poses an additional consideration beyond the statutory requirements. 
At the end of the decision, after carefully upholding its ruling in Ross, 
the court noted the difficulty of anticipating the dimensions of a case 
before it is tried, and instructed judges to inquire of counsel about 
racial prejudice where it might reasonably be expected to be a factor in 
the case. If "factors involving racial prejudice" are present, then the 
judge should question the prospective jurors in this area. The format 
of the questions is still within the judge's discretion, but the inquiry 
must be "sufficient to focus the attention of prospective jurors to any 
racial prejudice they might entertain."47 Presumably, the failure to ask 
will subject the record to close scrutiny to ascertain that no unfairness 
resulted, but reversal will not of necessity result. But this exception is 
limited to concerns about racial prejudice. Other prejudices which may 
be equally inconsistent with impartiality are not mentioned by the court, 
and consequently the decision to question with regard to them remains 
within the judge's discretionary powers. And, as the Supreme Court has 
limited its holding to the issue of race, this practice is constitutionally 
acceptable. 
If juror impartiality is an objective in state criminal procedures, it is 
submitted that Massachusetts procedure, although it complies with the 
Supreme Court's latest ruling, is inadequate. While one may question 
the effectiveness of even a detailed voir dire in eliminating biased jurors, 
strong evidence of bias is revealed in jury verdicts.4B Any serious prej-
udice, be it political, racial, ethnic, or religious, should properly be the 
subject of inquiry. As Justice Marshall stated in his dissent in Ham, 
the ,right to impartiality and fairness should not protect against only 
certain classes of prejudice or extend to certain groups in the population. 
Whatever may close a juror's mind and prevent a fair hearing should be 
the subject of inquiry49-whether it be a prejudice against beards, a 
42 Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1367, 275 N.E.2d 
33 (1971); Commonwealth v. Nassar, 354 Mass. 249, 237 N.E.2d 39 (1968); Common-
wealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273, N.E.2d 189 (1936). 
48 Commonwealth v. Buzzell, 33 Mass. 153 (1834). 
U Commonwealth v. Lee, 324 Mass. 714, 88 N.E.2d 713 (1949). 
411 Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 246 N.E.2d 433 (1969). 
46 The one reform brought directly by the Ham decision is that where special 
circumstances exist questions about race are required. 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 846, 296 
N.E.2d at 815-16. 
47 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 847, 296 N.E.2d at 816. 
48 H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The American Jury 210 (1966). 
49 409 U.S. at 531-32. See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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predisposition to believe policemen more readily than others, or a reluc-
tance to accept the diagnosis of a psychiatrist. Thus, where the case will 
present an issue known to be the subject of strong feelings within the 
community, the judge should specifically inquire whether this would 
affect a potential juror's objectivity. Admittedly, where the subject mat-
ter is not a generally agreed upon area of bias, the proponent should be 
required to demonstrate that his fears are more than speculative.110 
HELEN S. RAKoVE 
liO See United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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